Applied Cybernetics Group
T1528 Steal Application Access Token
- Technique
T1528- Tactics
- Credential Access
- Research, 90 days
- 3
- KEV CVEs mapped
- 1
- SigmaHQ rules
- 14
- Elastic, Splunk
- 50
- thrunt rules
- 0
- Upstream
- https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1528
MITRE description
Adversaries can steal application access tokens as a means of acquiring credentials to access remote systems and resources. Application access tokens are used to make authorized API requests on behalf of a user or service and are commonly used as a way to access resources in cloud and container-based applications and software-as-a-service (SaaS).(Citation: Auth0 - Why You Should Always Use Access Tokens to Secure APIs Sept 2019) Adversaries who steal account API tokens in cloud and containerized environments may be able to access data and perform actions with the permissions of these accounts, which can lead to privilege escalation and further compromise of the environment. For example, in Kubernetes environments, processes running inside a container may communicate with the Kubernetes API server using service account tokens. If a container is compromised, an adversary may be able to steal the container’s token and thereby gain access to Kubernetes API commands.(Citation: Kubernetes Service Accounts) Similarly, instances within continuous-development / continuous-integration (CI/CD) pipelines will often use API tokens to authenticate to other services for testing and deployment.(Citation: Cider Security Top 10 CICD Security Risks) If these pipelines are compromised, adversaries may be able to steal these tokens and leverage their privileges. In Azure, an adversary who compromises a resource with an attached Managed Identity, such as an Azure VM, can request short-lived tokens through the Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS). These tokens can then facilitate unauthorized actions or further access to other Azure services, bypassing typical credential-based authentication.(Citation: Entra Managed Identities 2025)(Citation: SpecterOps Managed Identity 2022) Token theft can also occur through social engineering, in which case user action may be required to grant access. OAuth is one commonly implemented framework that issues tokens to users for access to systems. An application desiring access to cloud-based services or protected APIs can gain entry using OAuth 2.0 through a variety of authorization protocols. An example commonly-used sequence is Microsoft's Authorization Code Grant flow.(Citation: Microsoft Identity Platform Protocols May 2019)(Citation: Microsoft - OAuth Code Authorization flow - June 2019) An OAuth access token enables a third-party application to interact with resources containing user data in the ways requested by the application without obtaining user credentials. Adversaries can leverage OAuth authorization by constructing a malicious application designed to be granted access to resources with the target user's OAuth token.(Citation: Amnesty OAuth Phishing Attacks, August 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Pawn Storm OAuth 2017) The adversary will need to complete registration of their application with the authorization server, for example Microsoft Identity Platform using Azure Portal, the Visual Studio IDE, the command-line interface, PowerShell, or REST API calls.(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD App Registration - May 2019) Then, they can send a [Spearphishing Link](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1566/002) to the target user to entice them to grant access to the application. Once the OAuth access token is granted, the application can gain potentially long-term access to features of the user account through [Application Access Token](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1550/001).(Citation: Microsoft - Azure AD Identity Tokens - Aug 2019) Application access tokens may function within a limited lifetime, limiting how long an adversary can utilize the stolen token. However, in some cases, adversaries can also steal application refresh tokens(Citation: Auth0 Understanding Refresh Tokens), allowing them to obtain new access tokens without prompting the user.
KEV CVEs mapped to this technique
MITRE CTID maps these KEV CVEs to this technique by hand. They are the actively exploited vulnerabilities behind this technique's KEV signal.
Research citing this technique
Reports and advisories from the last 90 days that cite this technique.
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2026-10-21Microsoft Threat Intelligence: AI-driven, large-scale nation-state campaign using ARTEX enables supply chain compromise -
2026-09-16Datadog Security Labs: Mapping out your unknown: A threat hunter’s guide to GitHub -
2026-09-02Huntress: Inside Knight Office, a New M365 AiTM Phishing Kit
Detection coverage
SigmaHQ community rules
- Delegated Permissions Granted For All Users (core)
- End User Consent Blocked (core)
- End User Consent (core)
- App Granted Microsoft Permissions (core)
- Application URI Configuration Changes (core)
- Anomalous Token (core)
- Anonymous IP Address (core)
- Primary Refresh Token Access Attempt (core)
- Suspicious Teams Application Related ObjectAcess Event (core)
- Microsoft Teams Sensitive File Access By Uncommon Applications (core)
- HackTool - Koh Default Named Pipe (core)
- Renamed BrowserCore.EXE Execution (core)
- Potentially Suspicious JWT Token Search Via CLI (core)
- Potentially Suspicious Command Targeting Teams Sensitive Files (core)
Elastic and Splunk rules
- Multi-Cloud CLI Token and Credential Access Commands (elastic)
- Potential Impersonation Attempt via Kubectl (elastic)
- Service Account Token or Certificate Access Followed by Kubernetes API Request (elastic)
- AWS Bedrock Model Invocation From High Number of Countries (elastic)
- AWS Bedrock Model Invocation Impossible Travel (elastic)
- Azure AKS Service Account Token Created via TokenRequest API (elastic)
- Entra ID OAuth Device Code Flow with Concurrent Sign-ins (elastic)
- Azure Service Principal Sign-In Followed by Arc Cluster Credential Access (elastic)
- Entra ID OAuth Device Code Sign-in to Azure AD Graph Enumeration (elastic)
- Entra ID Device-Bound PRT Replay via First-Party App from Unusual IP (elastic)
- Entra ID Device-Bound PRT from Unusual Device IP (elastic)
- Entra ID Concurrent Sign-in with Suspicious Properties (elastic)
- Entra ID End-User Consent to Application with High-Risk Delegated Scopes (elastic)
- Entra ID Illicit Consent Grant via Registered Application (elastic)
- Entra ID Kali365 Default User-Agent Detected (elastic)
- Entra ID OAuth Authorization Code Grant for Unusual User, App, and Resource (elastic)
- Entra ID OAuth Phishing via First-Party Microsoft Application (elastic)
- Entra ID User Sign-in with Unusual Client (elastic)
- Microsoft Entra ID Impossible Travel Sign-in (elastic)
- Entra ID OAuth Flow by Microsoft Authentication Broker to Device Registration Service (DRS) (elastic)
- Microsoft Graph Request User Impersonation by Unusual Client (elastic)
- Entra ID AiTM Phishing-Kit Chain Detected (elastic)
- Entra ID OAuth Application Redirect URI Modified (elastic)
- Entra ID OAuth PRT Issuance to Non-Managed Device Detected (elastic)
- Entra ID User Added as Registered Application Owner (elastic)
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