T1189 Drive-by Compromise

Technique: T1189
Tactics: Initial Access
Research, 90 days: 0
KEV CVEs mapped: 21
SigmaHQ rules: 3
Elastic, Splunk: 10
thrunt rules: 0
Upstream: https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1189

MITRE description

Adversaries may gain access to a system through a user visiting a website over the normal course of browsing. Multiple ways of delivering exploit code to a browser exist (i.e., [Drive-by Target](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1608/004)), including: * A legitimate website is compromised, allowing adversaries to inject malicious code * Script files served to a legitimate website from a publicly writeable cloud storage bucket are modified by an adversary * Malicious ads are paid for and served through legitimate ad providers (i.e., [Malvertising](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1583/008)) * Built-in web application interfaces that allow user-controllable content are leveraged for the insertion of malicious scripts or iFrames (e.g., cross-site scripting) Browser push notifications may also be abused by adversaries and leveraged for malicious code injection via [User Execution](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1204). By clicking "allow" on browser push notifications, users may be granting a website permission to run JavaScript code on their browser.(Citation: Push notifications - viruspositive)(Citation: push notification -mcafee)(Citation: push notifications - malwarebytes) Often the website used by an adversary is one visited by a specific community, such as government, a particular industry, or a particular region, where the goal is to compromise a specific user or set of users based on a shared interest. This kind of targeted campaign is often referred to a strategic web compromise or watering hole attack. There are several known examples of this occurring.(Citation: Shadowserver Strategic Web Compromise) Typical drive-by compromise process: 1. A user visits a website that is used to host the adversary controlled content. 2. Scripts automatically execute, typically searching versions of the browser and plugins for a potentially vulnerable version. The user may be required to assist in this process by enabling scripting, notifications, or active website components and ignoring warning dialog boxes. 3. Upon finding a vulnerable version, exploit code is delivered to the browser. 4. If exploitation is successful, the adversary will gain code execution on the user's system unless other protections are in place. In some cases, a second visit to the website after the initial scan is required before exploit code is delivered. Unlike [Exploit Public-Facing Application](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1190), the focus of this technique is to exploit software on a client endpoint upon visiting a website. This will commonly give an adversary access to systems on the internal network instead of external systems that may be in a DMZ.

KEV CVEs mapped to this technique

MITRE CTID maps these KEV CVEs to this technique by hand. They are the actively exploited vulnerabilities behind this technique's KEV signal.

Detection coverage

SigmaHQ community rules

Suspicious Browser Child Process - MacOS (core)
Flash Player Update from Suspicious Location (core)
Cross Site Scripting Strings (core)

Elastic and Splunk rules

GenAI Agent Instruction File Written to Downloads (elastic)
Suspicious Browser Child Process (elastic)
Unusual Web Request (elastic)
Potential DNS Rebinding from Public to Private Address (elastic)
Potential Masquerading as Business App Installer (elastic)
WPS Office Exploitation via DLL Hijack (elastic)
Potential Fake CAPTCHA Phishing Attack (elastic)
Potential TerminalFix Cloudflare Lure in PowerShell (elastic)
Splunk XSS Privilege Escalation via Custom Urls in Dashboard (splunk)
Detect hosts connecting to dynamic domain providers (splunk)

Signal counts reflect the current corpus snapshot. Research citations are the technique IDs named in vendor reports and government advisories from the last 90 days; KEV mappings come from MITRE CTID. Coverage is the SigmaHQ rule inventory (core, emerging-threats, threat-hunting) at release r2026-07-01 plus Elastic and Splunk production rules. Rule bodies are not mirrored; links go upstream.