Applied Cybernetics Group
Threat intel → detection pipeline
Friday, September 18, 2026
Data as of 13:09 UTC
Technique
T1098.005
Tactics
Persistence, Privilege Escalation
MISP citations
0
KEV CVEs mapped
0
Community rules
1
thrunt rules
1
Upstream
https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1098/005

MITRE description

Adversaries may register a device to an adversary-controlled account. Devices may be registered in a multifactor authentication (MFA) system, which handles authentication to the network, or in a device management system, which handles device access and compliance. MFA systems, such as Duo or Okta, allow users to associate devices with their accounts in order to complete MFA requirements. An adversary that compromises a user’s credentials may enroll a new device in order to bypass initial MFA requirements and gain persistent access to a network.(Citation: CISA MFA PrintNightmare)(Citation: DarkReading FireEye SolarWinds) In some cases, the MFA self-enrollment process may require only a username and password to enroll the account's first device or to enroll a device to an inactive account. (Citation: Mandiant APT29 Microsoft 365 2022) Similarly, an adversary with existing access to a network may register a device or a virtual machine to Entra ID and/or its device management system, Microsoft Intune, in order to access sensitive data or resources while bypassing conditional access policies.(Citation: AADInternals - Device Registration)(Citation: AADInternals - Conditional Access Bypass)(Citation: Microsoft DEV-0537)(Citation: Expel Atlas Lion 2025) Devices registered in Entra ID may be able to conduct [Internal Spearphishing](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1534) campaigns via intra-organizational emails, which are less likely to be treated as suspicious by the email client.(Citation: Microsoft - Device Registration) Additionally, an adversary may be able to perform a [Service Exhaustion Flood](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1499/002) on an Entra ID tenant by registering a large number of devices.(Citation: AADInternals - BPRT)

Detection coverage

thrunt rules

SigmaHQ community rules

Signal counts reflect the current corpus snapshot: MISP citations are regex-extracted from CIRCL OSINT event text and galaxy tags; KEV mappings come from MITRE CTID; community coverage is the SigmaHQ rule inventory (core, emerging-threats, threat-hunting collections) at release r2026-07-01. Rule bodies are not mirrored — links go upstream.